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Critical	  Study:	  Cassam	  on	  Self-­‐Knowledge	  for	  Humans1	  
Matthew	  Boyle,	  Harvard	  University	  
	  
Not	  so	  long	  ago,	  in	  the	  late	  20th	  century,	  philosophers	  of	  mind	  generally	  assumed	  that	  we	  have	  
some	  sort	  of	  privileged	  access	  to,	  or	  at	  any	  rate	  some	  special	  authority	  in	  speaking	  about,	  our	  
own	  mental	  states.	  	  Most	  did	  not	  assume	  that	  this	  privilege	  extends	  to	  every	  aspect	  of	  our	  
mental	  lives,	  but	  most	  did	  assume	  that	  we	  are	  at	  least	  in	  a	  specially	  favorable	  position	  to	  know	  
our	  own	  thoughts	  and	  feelings,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  our	  own	  standing	  attitudes	  such	  as	  belief,	  
desire,	  and	  intention,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  Moreover,	  late	  twentieth	  century	  philosophers	  typically	  
assumed	  that	  this	  privilege	  reflects	  some	  difference	  of	  principle	  in	  the	  way	  we	  can	  gain	  
knowledge	  of	  these	  topics.	  	  The	  problem	  was	  to	  explain	  this	  difference	  of	  principle.2	  
	   Times	  change,	  however,	  and	  there	  are	  now	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  philosophers	  who	  
question	  the	  datum	  this	  tradition	  set	  out	  to	  explain.	  	  Quassim	  Cassam’s	  Self-­‐Knowledge	  for	  
Humans	  (2014)	  is	  a	  particularly	  direct	  and	  pointed	  contribution	  to	  this	  counteroffensive.3	  	  Like	  
all	  of	  Cassam’s	  work,	  it	  contains	  much	  careful	  philosophical	  argumentation;	  but	  it	  aims	  to	  be	  a	  
book,	  not	  just	  for	  philosophers,	  but	  for	  any	  thinking	  person	  interested	  in	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  The	  
discussion	  is	  admirably	  engaging	  and	  down-­‐to-­‐earth	  throughout.	  	  	  
	   One	  major	  aim	  of	  the	  book	  is	  to	  challenge	  the	  idea	  that	  our	  mode	  of	  awareness	  of	  our	  
own	  attitudes	  differs	  in	  principle	  from	  our	  mode	  of	  awareness	  of	  the	  attitudes	  of	  others.	  	  
Cassam	  grants	  that	  we	  may	  in	  fact	  know	  more	  than	  other	  people	  do	  about	  our	  own	  present	  
beliefs,	  desires,	  and	  intentions,	  at	  least	  when	  these	  attitudes	  concern	  matters	  that	  are	  not	  
bound	  up	  with	  our	  self-­‐conception;	  but	  he	  denies	  that	  any	  such	  de	  facto	  asymmetry	  in	  how	  
much	  we	  know	  reflects	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  mode	  of	  awareness.	  	  I	  discern	  the	  attitudes	  of	  
other	  people	  by	  a	  kind	  of	  interpretation:	  I	  draw	  inferences	  from	  their	  words,	  deeds,	  and	  other	  
expressive	  behavior.	  	  When	  I	  ascribe	  attitudes	  to	  myself,	  my	  evidence	  typically	  includes	  more	  
than	  this,	  since	  I	  have	  access	  not	  only	  to	  such	  outward	  signs	  but	  also	  to	  my	  own	  inner	  
monologue	  and	  whatever	  images	  or	  impressions	  may	  accompany	  it.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Cassam	  
argues,	  I	  pass	  from	  this	  evidence	  to	  knowledge	  of	  my	  own	  attitudes	  by	  taking	  a	  step	  of	  the	  same	  
broadly	  inferential	  kind	  as	  the	  one	  I	  take	  in	  interpreting	  others.	  	  The	  relevant	  inferences	  may	  
occur	  effortlessly	  and	  automatically,	  and	  this	  may	  give	  us	  the	  impression	  that	  we	  have	  
immediate	  and	  noninferential	  access	  our	  own	  minds;	  but	  from	  an	  epistemological	  perspective,	  
attitudinal	  self-­‐knowledge	  is	  no	  less	  inferential	  than	  knowledge	  of	  the	  attitudes	  of	  others.	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   The	  larger	  aim	  of	  Self-­‐Knowledge	  for	  Humans,	  however,	  is	  not	  merely	  to	  defend	  such	  
inferentialism.	  	  As	  his	  title	  indicates,	  Cassam	  thinks	  mainstream	  work	  on	  self-­‐knowledge	  fails	  to	  
offer	  an	  account	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  ‘for	  humans’.	  	  The	  sort	  of	  humanity	  Cassam	  has	  in	  mind	  is	  
not	  the	  sort	  that	  elevates	  us	  above	  the	  beasts,	  but	  the	  kind	  evoked	  by	  the	  phrase	  ‘only	  human’,	  
as	  in	  the	  Human	  League’s	  chart-­‐topping	  single	  of	  1986:	  	  
	   I’m	  only	  human	  
	   Of	  flesh	  and	  blood	  I’m	  made	  	  
	   Human	  	  
	   Born	  to	  make	  mistakes	  	  	  
Humans	  in	  this	  sense	  stand	  opposed	  to	  Vulcans,	  that	  remarkable	  race	  of	  alien	  beings	  whose	  
rationality	  is	  never	  hampered	  by	  haste,	  emotion,	  fatigue,	  or	  self-­‐deceit.	  	  That	  we	  homo	  sapiens	  
are	  not	  such	  beings	  is	  widely	  recognized	  –	  the	  Human	  League	  were	  aware	  of	  it,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  crucial	  
premise	  of	  Star	  Trek	  –	  but	  Cassam	  points	  out	  that	  our	  anecdotal	  evidence	  for	  this	  conclusion	  has	  
been	  powerfully	  reinforced	  in	  the	  recent	  decades	  by	  rigorous	  studies	  of	  human	  reasoning	  and	  
decision-­‐making.4	  	  We	  are,	  it	  turns	  out,	  systematically	  liable	  to	  form	  beliefs	  and	  make	  choices,	  
not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  rationally	  defensible	  principles,	  but	  by	  employing	  simplifying	  ‘heuristics’	  
which	  get	  us	  to	  the	  optimal	  outcome	  in	  some	  cases,	  but	  lead	  us	  astray	  in	  others.	  	  Moreover,	  we	  
typically	  do	  not	  recognize	  the	  role	  that	  such	  heuristics	  play	  in	  our	  thinking,	  and	  often	  are	  
disposed	  to	  give	  demonstrably	  confabulated	  accounts	  of	  our	  reasons	  for	  believing	  or	  choosing	  
as	  we	  do.	  
	   All	  this	  is	  certainly	  discouraging	  news,	  but	  who	  should	  be	  surprised	  by	  it?	  	  According	  to	  
Cassam,	  it	  should	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  a	  group	  of	  philosophers	  he	  calls	  ‘Rationalists	  about	  self-­‐
knowledge’,	  whose	  core	  idea	  is	  that	  we	  can	  know	  our	  own	  minds	  by	  employing	  the	  
‘Transparency	  Method’,	  which	  tells	  us	  that	  we	  can	  determine	  our	  own	  attitude	  toward	  a	  given	  
proposition	  p	  by	  considering	  some	  corresponding	  first-­‐order	  question	  about	  p	  itself.	  	  Cassam	  
argues	  that	  philosophers	  who	  think	  this	  strategy	  can	  provide	  a	  general	  account	  of	  how	  we	  know	  
our	  own	  attitudes	  are	  committed	  to	  supposing	  that,	  in	  general,	  our	  attitudes	  are	  as	  they	  
rationally	  ought	  to	  be.	  	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  the	  evidence	  that	  humans	  are	  only	  imperfectly	  
rational	  constitutes	  prima	  facie	  evidence	  that	  the	  Rationalist	  theory	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  does	  not	  
apply	  to	  humans,	  but	  to	  some	  other	  superhuman	  sort	  of	  creature.	  	  Cassam	  calls	  this	  other	  sort	  
of	  creature	  ‘homo	  philosophicus’,	  by	  analogy	  with	  the	  idealized	  ‘homo	  economicus’	  of	  classical	  
economic	  theory.	  	  I	  will	  simply	  call	  them	  ‘Vulcans’.	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   Cassam	  sees	  Rationalism	  as	  epitomizing	  the	  philosophical	  tendency	  to	  ignore	  our	  
humanity	  in	  theorizing	  about	  self-­‐knowledge,	  but	  he	  thinks	  this	  charge	  applies	  in	  a	  broader	  
sense	  to	  much	  mainstream	  discussion	  of	  the	  topic.	  	  In	  general,	  he	  holds	  that	  philosophers	  have	  
exaggerated	  both	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  we	  have	  privileged	  knowledge	  of	  our	  own	  minds	  and	  the	  
immediacy	  with	  which	  we	  have	  this	  knowledge	  when	  we	  do.	  	  Indeed,	  he	  suggests	  that	  
mainstream	  philosophical	  work	  on	  self-­‐knowledge	  has	  lost	  touch	  with	  the	  human	  interest	  of	  the	  
topic.	  	  When	  ordinary	  people	  hear	  the	  term	  ‘self-­‐knowledge’,	  they	  think	  of	  knowledge	  whose	  
acquisition	  would	  be	  a	  substantial	  achievement:	  knowledge	  of	  my	  true	  character,	  for	  instance,	  
or	  of	  which	  of	  my	  professed	  values	  I	  genuinely	  hold.	  	  Philosophers,	  by	  contrast,	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  
varieties	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  whose	  triviality	  would	  astonish	  ordinary	  people:	  knowledge	  of	  
whether	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  raining,	  for	  instance,	  and	  knowledge	  of	  whether	  I	  presently	  feel	  
toothache.	  	  Why	  do	  philosophers	  engage	  in	  scholastic	  disputes	  about	  such	  matters	  when	  there	  
are	  real	  and	  significant	  questions	  that	  beg	  to	  be	  addressed?	  	  This,	  in	  effect,	  is	  Cassam’s	  
challenge	  to	  mainstream	  philosophical	  work	  on	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  	  
	   I	  think	  this	  is	  a	  valuable	  challenge:	  it	  is	  striking	  that	  so	  much	  philosophical	  discussion	  is	  
devoted	  to	  relatively	  trivial	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  What	  justifies	  this	  focus?	  	  I	  hope	  to	  say	  something	  
about	  this,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  first	  to	  address	  some	  misrepresentations	  in	  
Cassam’s	  presentation	  of	  the	  transparency	  approach	  and	  to	  raise	  some	  doubts	  about	  whether	  
we	  can	  be	  satisfied	  with	  Cassam’s	  inferentialism.	  	  These	  tasks	  will	  occupy	  me	  in	  the	  next	  two	  
sections.	  	  In	  the	  final	  section,	  I	  will	  return	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  philosophical	  (and	  human)	  
interest	  of	  ‘trivial’	  self-­‐knowledge.	  
	  
1.	  	  	   Transparency	  and	  Vulcanism	  
Cassam’s	  book	  is	  cast	  as	  a	  rebuke	  to	  mainstream	  philosophical	  theorizing	  about	  self-­‐knowledge	  
as	  a	  whole,	  but	  it	  is	  particularly	  addressed	  to	  approaches	  that	  emphasize	  the	  ‘transparency’	  of	  
questions	  about	  our	  own	  attitudes	  to	  questions	  about	  the	  world	  toward	  which	  our	  attitudes	  are	  
directed.	  	  These	  approaches,	  which	  have	  loomed	  large	  in	  recent	  discussion,	  take	  their	  departure	  
from	  the	  observation	  that,	  in	  various	  cases,	  there	  is	  a	  correlation	  between	  how	  I	  would	  answer	  
some	  world-­‐directed	  question	  and	  how	  I	  should	  answer	  some	  question	  about	  my	  own	  attitude.	  	  
Given	  this	  correlation,	  they	  argue,	  I	  can	  answer	  the	  question	  whether	  I	  hold	  a	  given	  attitude	  by	  
treating	  it	  as	  ‘transparent’	  to	  a	  corresponding	  world-­‐directed	  question.	  	  The	  most	  widely	  
discussed	  case	  of	  transparency	  concerns	  belief:	  Gareth	  Evans	  (1982),	  Richard	  Moran	  (2001),	  and	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others	  have	  argued	  that	  I	  can	  determine	  whether	  I	  believe	  that	  p	  simply	  by	  treating	  this	  
question	  as	  transparent	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  p	  itself	  is	  true.	  	  When	  consideration	  of	  the	  
latter	  question	  leads	  me	  to	  affirm	  that	  p,	  I	  should	  affirm	  that	  I	  believe	  that	  p;	  otherwise	  not.	  
	   Cassam	  contends	  that	  this	  observation	  could	  supply	  the	  model	  for	  a	  general	  account	  of	  
attitudinal	  self-­‐knowledge	  only	  if	  we	  were	  Vulcans.	  	  But	  why	  should	  this	  be?	  	  There	  is	  no	  need	  to	  
mention	  rationality	  in	  stating	  the	  basic	  idea	  of	  the	  transparency	  approach,	  at	  least	  as	  I	  have	  
characterized	  it.	  	  And	  what	  I	  have	  just	  said	  about	  the	  transparency	  of	  belief	  is	  perfectly	  standard,	  
and	  fits	  the	  characterizations	  Cassam	  himself	  quotes	  (cf.	  3,	  102).5	  	  To	  generalize	  the	  approach,	  it	  
would	  be	  necessary	  to	  find	  world-­‐directed	  questions	  whose	  answers	  correlate	  with	  other	  
attitudes.	  	  But	  what	  feature	  of	  this	  project	  requires	  us	  to	  presuppose	  that,	  in	  general,	  we	  hold	  
only	  attitudes	  that	  we	  rationally	  ought	  to	  hold?	  
	   Cassam	  makes	  a	  three-­‐step	  case	  for	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  transparency	  approach	  
and	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  are	  Vulcans.	  	  First,	  he	  notes	  that,	  at	  least	  according	  to	  Richard	  Moran’s	  
influential	  account,	  doxastic	  transparency	  is	  intelligible	  only	  insofar	  as	  I	  am	  entitled	  to	  assume	  
that	  what	  I	  believe	  regarding	  p	  is	  ‘determined	  by	  my	  reflection	  on	  [the]	  reasons’	  that	  speak	  in	  
favor	  of	  p	  (Moran	  2003:	  405;	  quoted	  at	  Cassam	  2014:	  3).	  	  Not	  all	  transparency	  theorists	  agree	  
with	  Moran	  about	  this,	  but	  there	  is	  at	  any	  rate	  a	  significant	  body	  of	  work	  (including	  work	  by	  the	  
present	  reviewer)	  that	  accepts	  Moran’s	  claim	  about	  the	  link	  between	  transparency	  and	  
reflection	  on	  reasons.	  	  Second,	  Cassam	  observes	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  we	  might	  generalize	  
Moran’s	  idea	  to	  attitudes	  other	  than	  belief:	  what	  sort	  of	  reflection	  on	  reasons	  would	  allow	  me	  
to	  determine	  what	  I	  fear,	  or	  want,	  or	  hope?	  	  Moran	  does	  not	  discuss	  this	  problem	  in	  detail,	  but	  
Cassam	  notes	  that	  David	  Finkelstein	  has	  proposed	  a	  ‘helpful	  recasting’	  of	  Moran’s	  idea	  that	  
looks	  like	  it	  might	  admit	  of	  generalization.	  	  According	  to	  Finkelstein,	  	  
The	  question	  of	  whether	  I	  believe	  that	  P	  is,	  for	  me,	  transparent	  to	  the	  question	  
of	  what	  I	  ought	  rationally	  to	  believe.	  (2012:	  103;	  quoted	  at	  Cassam	  2014:	  4)	  
In	  general,	  Cassam	  suggests,	  we	  may	  take	  transparency	  theorists	  to	  hold	  that	  I	  can	  treat	  the	  
question	  whether	  I	  hold	  some	  attitude	  A	  as	  transparent	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  I	  ought	  
rationally	  to	  hold	  A.	  	  Finally,	  Cassam	  suggests	  that	  this	  ‘Transparency	  Method’	  (TM)	  for	  
determining	  my	  own	  attitudes	  will	  reliably	  lead	  me	  to	  knowledge	  only	  on	  two	  assumptions:	  first,	  
that	  my	  attitudes	  are	  in	  general	  as	  they	  rationally	  ought	  to	  be;	  and	  second,	  that	  I	  am	  entitled	  to	  
assume	  this	  about	  myself	  (4-­‐5,	  51-­‐2).	  	  The	  first	  assumption	  is	  that	  we	  are	  Vulcans,	  or	  near	  
enough;	  the	  second	  is	  that	  we	  are	  entitled	  to	  believe	  ourselves	  to	  be	  Vulcans.	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   Much	  of	  Cassam’s	  book	  is	  then	  devoted	  to	  arguing	  that	  we	  are	  not	  Vulcans.	  	  He	  also	  
objects	  that,	  in	  many	  cases,	  it	  may	  be	  perfectly	  clear	  to	  me	  what	  my	  attitude	  on	  a	  given	  topic	  is,	  
although	  it	  is	  quite	  unclear	  what	  attitude,	  if	  any,	  I	  rationally	  ought	  to	  hold	  on	  that	  topic	  (6-­‐7,	  
104-­‐6).	  	  Finally,	  he	  suggests	  that,	  even	  where	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  know	  one’s	  own	  attitudes	  by	  TM,	  
this	  is	  itself	  a	  case	  of	  inference,	  mediated	  by	  the	  premise	  that	  one’s	  attitude	  on	  a	  given	  topic	  is	  
as	  it	  rationally	  ought	  to	  be	  (6,	  111-­‐12,	  117-­‐18).	  	  	  
	   All	  of	  these	  objections	  rest,	  however,	  on	  the	  cogency	  of	  Cassam’s	  case	  for	  attributing	  to	  
transparency	  theorists	  a	  commitment	  to	  supposing	  that	  our	  attitudes	  are	  as	  they	  rationally	  
ought	  to	  be.	  	  I	  think	  the	  case	  is	  flawed	  at	  several	  points.	  	  The	  most	  fundamental	  issue	  concerns	  
what	  Moran	  means	  when	  he	  claims	  that	  doxastic	  transparency	  is	  intelligible	  only	  if	  I	  can	  assume	  
my	  belief	  regarding	  p	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  my	  reflection	  on	  reasons	  in	  favor	  of	  p,	  but	  let	  me	  set	  
this	  aside	  for	  a	  moment	  and	  address	  the	  latter	  two	  steps.	  	  	  
	   First,	  a	  word	  about	  generalizing	  the	  transparency	  approach	  beyond	  the	  case	  of	  belief.	  	  I	  
do	  not	  accept	  Finkelstein’s	  proposal	  as	  a	  charitable	  interpretation	  of	  the	  transparency	  approach.	  	  
Cassam’s	  book	  might	  give	  one	  the	  impression	  that	  Finkelstein	  is	  an	  advocate	  of	  this	  approach,	  
but	  in	  fact	  he	  is	  a	  critic	  aiming	  to	  make	  it	  out	  to	  be	  silly.	  	  It	  would	  indeed	  be	  silly	  to	  propose	  that,	  
in	  general,	  I	  can	  know	  whether	  I	  hold	  some	  attitude	  A	  by	  considering	  whether	  I	  ought	  rationally	  
to	  hold	  A,	  but	  this	  is	  simply	  not	  the	  view	  of	  Moran	  or	  other	  major	  advocates	  of	  this	  approach.6	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  belief,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  world-­‐directed	  question	  to	  which	  the	  question	  about	  
whether	  I	  believe	  that	  p	  is	  transparent	  can	  be	  stated	  without	  any	  mention	  of	  rationality:	  it	  is	  
simply	  the	  question	  whether	  p.	  	  To	  generalize	  the	  approach,	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  identify	  
world-­‐directed	  questions	  corresponding	  to	  other	  attitudes,	  and	  there	  has	  been	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  
work	  on	  this,	  which	  Cassam	  does	  not	  review.	  	  Evans	  suggests,	  for	  instance,	  that	  whether	  it	  
visually	  appears	  to	  me	  that	  p	  is	  correlated	  with	  whether	  p	  would	  figure	  in	  my	  answer	  to	  the	  
question	  how	  things	  are	  directly	  in	  front	  of	  me,	  when	  I	  constrain	  my	  answer	  in	  certain	  
specifiable	  ways	  (Evans	  1982:	  227-­‐8).	  	  Alex	  Byrne	  (2011)	  has	  argued	  that	  whether	  I	  intend	  to	  do	  
A	  is	  correlated	  with	  my	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  I	  will	  do	  A,	  when	  I	  answer	  the	  latter	  
question	  only	  on	  a	  certain	  sort	  of	  basis.	  	  Characterizing	  the	  relevant	  world-­‐directed	  questions	  is	  
not	  a	  simple	  task	  –	  not	  significantly	  simpler	  than,	  and	  closely	  related	  to,	  the	  task	  of	  giving	  a	  
philosophical	  analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  attitudes.	  	  But	  the	  idea	  that	  such	  characterizations	  can	  in	  
principle	  be	  given	  is	  no	  less	  plausible	  than	  the	  idea	  that,	  to	  each	  type	  of	  attitude,	  there	  
corresponds	  a	  characteristic	  stance	  on	  some	  question	  about	  the	  non-­‐mental	  world.	  	  And	  this	  is	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surely	  an	  interesting	  idea,	  and	  not	  obviously	  a	  false	  one.	  	  At	  any	  rate,	  no	  reason	  has	  been	  given	  
why	  implementing	  this	  suggestion	  requires	  appealing	  to	  questions	  about	  what	  attitudes	  one	  
ought	  rationally	  to	  have.	  
	   Let	  us,	  however,	  grant	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  TM	  says	  I	  should	  treat	  the	  question	  
whether	  I	  hold	  a	  given	  attitude	  A	  as	  transparent	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  I	  ought	  rationally	  to	  
hold	  A.	  	  Even	  if	  this	  is	  granted,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  the	  soundness	  of	  TM	  depends	  on	  my	  
attitudes	  being	  in	  general	  as	  they	  rationally	  ought	  to	  be.	  	  Let	  us	  focus	  for	  simplicity	  on	  the	  case	  
of	  belief	  –	  the	  same	  point	  could	  be	  made	  for	  any	  other	  attitude.	  	  Suppose	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  my	  
belief	  about	  some	  proposition	  p	  is	  not,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  as	  it	  rationally	  ought	  to	  be:	  no	  matter	  
how	  carefully	  I	  consider	  the	  overwhelming	  evidence	  that	  not-­‐p,	  still	  I	  find	  myself	  returning	  to	  
the	  view	  that	  p.	  	  Following	  TM	  could	  still	  lead	  me	  to	  reliably	  correct	  answers	  about	  whether	  I	  
believe	  that	  p	  provided	  that	  the	  same	  imperviousness	  to	  evidence	  affects	  my	  judgment	  about	  
whether	  I	  rationally	  ought	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  To	  raise	  a	  problem	  for	  Cassam’s	  argument,	  I	  need	  
not	  insist	  that	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  regularly	  the	  case	  (though	  I	  suspect	  it	  may	  be):	  it	  suffices	  that	  TM	  
could	  be	  a	  reliable	  method	  for	  determining	  one’s	  attitudes	  even	  if	  one’s	  attitudes	  were	  not	  in	  
general	  as	  they	  rationally	  ought	  to	  be.	  	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  someone	  who	  claims	  we	  can	  know	  
our	  own	  attitudes	  by	  TM	  is	  not	  thereby	  committed	  to	  assuming	  that	  our	  attitudes	  are	  generally	  
as	  they	  rationally	  ought	  to	  be.7	  	  There	  is	  simply	  no	  direct	  connection	  between	  TM	  and	  the	  
assumption	  that	  we	  are	  Vulcans,	  even	  on	  Cassam’s	  contentious	  understanding	  of	  TM.	  	  	  
	   What	  about	  Moran’s	  claim	  that	  doxastic	  transparency	  is	  intelligible	  only	  if	  I	  can	  assume	  
my	  belief	  concerning	  p	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  my	  reflection	  on	  reasons	  in	  favor	  of	  p?	  	  Doesn’t	  this	  
posit	  some	  sort	  of	  connection	  between	  transparency	  and	  rationality?	  	  Yes,	  but	  a	  quite	  different	  
sort	  from	  the	  one	  Cassam	  supposes.	  	  Transparency	  theorists	  begin	  by	  noting	  a	  connection	  
between	  the	  self-­‐directed	  question	  whether	  I	  believe	  that	  p	  and	  the	  world-­‐directed	  question	  
whether	  p.	  	  The	  latter	  question	  invites,	  not	  an	  investigation	  of	  my	  own	  psychological	  state,	  but	  
an	  assessment	  of	  whether	  the	  relevant	  worldly	  proposition	  is	  true:	  it	  calls	  on	  me	  to	  exercise	  my	  
power	  to	  judge	  whether	  p.8	  	  On	  some	  occasions,	  I	  do	  not	  need	  to	  deliberate	  about	  this	  question:	  
my	  view	  is	  already	  settled.	  	  On	  others,	  I	  may	  consider	  evidence	  but	  assess	  it	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
deviates	  from	  norms	  of	  rationality:	  perhaps	  my	  judgment	  results	  form	  the	  operation	  of	  one	  of	  
the	  natural	  but	  unsound	  heuristics	  identified	  by	  psychologists.	  	  Regardless,	  the	  power	  I	  exercise	  
in	  answering	  the	  question	  whether	  p	  is	  my	  power	  to	  judge	  whether	  p.	  	  But	  no	  one	  could	  have	  
this	  power	  without	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  consider	  evidence	  for	  and	  against	  the	  truth	  of	  a	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proposition,	  and	  to	  affirm	  or	  reject	  propositions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  such	  consideration.	  	  The	  
question	  I	  confront	  in	  exercising	  this	  power	  is,	  as	  Moran	  puts	  it,	  a	  ‘deliberative	  question’:	  a	  
question	  about	  whether	  to	  accept	  the	  relevant	  proposition.	  	  The	  infinitival	  form	  of	  the	  verb	  here	  
indicates	  the	  characteristic	  perspective	  of	  a	  rational	  capacity:	  it	  regards	  my	  stance	  on	  whether	  p	  
not	  as	  a	  given	  fact,	  but	  as	  mine	  to	  settle.	  	  This	  holds	  true	  even	  if	  I	  answer	  by	  reaffirming	  an	  
already	  settled	  view,	  or	  arrive	  at	  my	  judgment	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  normatively	  defective.9	  	  	  
	   When	  Moran	  speaks	  of	  assuming	  that	  my	  belief	  concerning	  p	  is	  ‘determined	  by	  my	  
reflection	  on	  reasons’	  in	  favor	  of	  p,	  what	  he	  has	  in	  mind,	  I	  think,	  is	  just	  this:	  that	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  
make	  sense	  for	  me	  to	  treat	  the	  question	  whether	  I	  believe	  that	  p	  as	  transparent	  to	  the	  question	  
whether	  p,	  I	  must	  presume	  that	  my	  belief	  as	  to	  whether	  p	  just	  is	  the	  answer	  I	  am	  disposed	  to	  
reach	  by	  exercising	  my	  rational	  capacity	  to	  judge	  whether	  p.	  	  	  
	   It	  is,	  of	  course,	  possible	  for	  a	  person’s	  reflective	  judgment	  on	  p	  to	  part	  company	  with	  
her	  underlying	  belief	  on	  the	  matter.	  	  When	  she	  explicitly	  considers	  whether	  p,	  she	  may	  reach	  
one	  conclusion,	  but	  another	  view	  may	  be	  reflected	  in	  her	  persisting	  tendencies	  to	  react	  and	  
respond.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  TM	  will	  not	  offer	  her	  a	  sound	  route	  by	  which	  to	  assess	  whether	  she	  
believes	  that	  p.	  	  But	  this	  is	  just	  Moran’s	  point:	  a	  person	  whose	  reflection	  on	  whether	  p	  parts	  
ways	  with	  her	  underlying	  belief	  cannot	  know	  her	  belief	  simply	  by	  looking	  out	  toward	  the	  world;	  
she	  must	  observe	  herself	  and	  draw	  inferences.	  	  Thus,	  where	  transparency	  does	  not	  obtain,	  we	  
can	  say	  that	  a	  person	  is	  alienated	  from	  her	  own	  belief:	  she	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  knowing	  it	  from	  a	  
participant’s	  standpoint,	  so	  to	  speak.	  	  Where	  transparency	  does	  obtain,	  by	  contrast,	  a	  person’s	  
belief	  is	  precisely	  what	  is	  expressed	  in	  her	  rational	  reflection.	  	  But	  when	  I	  speak	  of	  ‘her	  rational	  
reflection’	  here,	  I	  am	  just	  referring	  to	  her	  exercise	  of	  her	  capacity	  explicitly	  to	  consider	  a	  
question	  and	  make	  a	  judgment.	  	  She	  may	  well	  exercise	  this	  capacity	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  
‘rational’	  in	  the	  normative	  sense.	  
	   Indeed,	  the	  connection	  between	  self-­‐knowledge	  and	  reflection	  on	  reasons	  can	  hold	  
even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘recalcitrant	  attitudes’	  that	  are	  impervious	  to	  our	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  
judgments.	  	  If	  I	  have	  an	  unconquerable	  fear	  of	  flying	  that	  persists	  even	  as	  I	  judge	  there	  to	  be	  no	  
real	  basis	  for	  fear,	  still,	  insofar	  as	  I	  am	  not	  alienated	  from	  my	  fear,	  I	  will	  be	  able	  to	  see	  the	  world	  
from	  its	  perspective,	  so	  to	  speak.	  	  It	  is	  not	  just	  that,	  when	  I	  fly,	  I	  will	  find	  my	  brow	  sweating	  and	  
my	  hands	  gripping	  the	  armrests;	  I	  will	  experience	  flight	  as	  perilous,	  and	  have	  my	  reasons	  for	  
concern:	  this	  moment	  of	  turbulence;	  that	  unexplained	  knocking	  noise.	  	  My	  fear	  has	  its	  own	  
rational	  perspective	  on	  the	  world,	  and	  I	  can	  give	  myself	  over	  to	  this	  perspective,	  and	  know	  that	  I	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am	  afraid,	  and	  what	  I	  am	  afraid	  of,	  in	  this	  way.	  	  So,	  contrary	  to	  what	  Cassam	  supposes	  (107ff.),	  a	  
version	  of	  Moran’s	  transparency	  point	  applies	  even	  to	  recalcitrant	  attitudes.	  	  The	  point	  concerns	  
the	  connection	  between	  attitudinal	  self-­‐knowledge	  and	  our	  rational	  capacity	  for	  judgment.	  	  It	  
simply	  has	  no	  direct	  connection	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  we	  are	  Vulcans.	  
	   Transparency	  theorists	  are	  thus	  not	  committed	  to	  supposing	  that	  we	  determine	  what	  
our	  attitudes	  are	  by	  asking	  what	  attitudes	  we	  rationally	  ought	  to	  hold;	  and	  even	  if	  they	  did	  
maintain	  this,	  they	  would	  not	  be	  committed	  to	  assuming	  that	  we	  are	  Vulcans.	  	  I	  conclude	  that	  
‘Rationalism	  about	  self-­‐knowledge’	  is	  a	  chimera	  constructed	  by	  fusing	  the	  transparency	  
approach	  to	  a	  commitment	  that	  transparency	  theorists	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  accept.	  	  Like	  classical	  
chimeras,	  this	  is	  a	  mythical	  creature.	  	  	  
	  
2.	   Inference	  and	  Alienation	  
Cassam’s	  account	  of	  how	  we	  know	  our	  own	  attitudes	  is	  that,	  quite	  generally,	  we	  know	  them	  by	  
inference.	  	  To	  illustrate	  what	  he	  has	  in	  mind,	  he	  invokes	  a	  case	  described	  by	  Krista	  Lawlor	  
(2009),	  in	  which	  a	  woman	  considers	  whether	  she	  wants	  another	  child	  and	  comes	  to	  recognize	  
that	  she	  does	  by	  paying	  attention	  to	  her	  own	  thoughts	  and	  experiences:	  a	  dreamy	  state	  of	  
recollection	  she	  falls	  into	  while	  boxing	  up	  her	  first	  child’s	  outgrown	  clothes,	  a	  feeling	  of	  envy	  
that	  comes	  over	  her	  at	  the	  news	  of	  a	  friend’s	  pregnancy,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Following	  Lawlor,	  Cassam	  
describes	  this	  woman	  as	  making	  an	  ‘inference	  from	  internal	  promptings’	  (143):	  she	  infers	  her	  
standing	  attitude	  of	  wanting	  another	  child	  as	  the	  best	  explanation	  of	  certain	  conscious	  episodes,	  
against	  the	  background	  of	  some	  tacitly-­‐held	  theory	  of	  how	  wants	  express	  themselves.	  	  
Moreover,	  Cassam	  suggests	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  inferential	  account	  applies	  not	  only	  to	  cases	  like	  
Lawlor’s,	  but	  even	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  cases	  favored	  by	  transparency	  theorists,	  such	  as	  knowing	  my	  
belief	  concerning	  p	  by	  considering	  whether	  p	  and	  making	  a	  judgment.	  	  For,	  Cassam	  argues,	  
judging	  that	  p	  is	  just	  one	  more	  conscious	  episode,	  which	  may	  be	  good	  evidence	  that	  I	  believe	  
that	  p,	  but	  only	  on	  the	  assumption	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  this	  case,	  my	  conscious	  judgment	  reflects	  my	  
standing	  belief	  (111,	  117).10	  	  So	  this	  too	  is	  an	  inference,	  even	  if	  it	  occurs	  effortlessly	  and	  
automatically.	  	  Indeed,	  Cassam	  argues,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  plausible	  to	  hold	  that	  we	  know	  our	  own	  
attitudes	  by	  inner	  perception,	  and	  not	  acceptable	  to	  claim	  that	  we	  know	  them	  ‘from	  nothing’,	  
inferentialism	  is	  really	  ‘the	  only	  game	  in	  town’	  (158).	  	  	  
	   In	  a	  fuller	  discussion	  I	  would	  want	  to	  contest	  several	  points	  in	  this	  argument,	  but	  in	  this	  
review	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  just	  one	  worry	  about	  Cassam’s	  inferentialism:	  that	  it	  would	  imply	  that,	  in	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general,	  we	  are	  alienated	  from	  our	  own	  attitudes,	  whereas	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  normally	  we	  are	  not	  
alienated	  from	  them.	  	  This	  is	  Richard	  Moran’s	  objection11	  to	  inferentialism,	  and	  Cassam	  is	  aware	  
of	  it,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  think	  it	  succeeds.	  	  His	  reply	  is	  that,	  if	  to	  be	  alienated	  from	  an	  attitude	  is	  to	  
find	  it	  persisting	  even	  though	  I	  reject	  it,	  or	  do	  not	  identify	  with	  it	  as	  expressing	  my	  view	  of	  the	  
world,	  then	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  have	  inferred	  my	  attitude	  from	  inner	  promptings	  need	  not	  imply	  
alienation.	  	  I	  may	  be	  alienated	  from	  some	  of	  the	  attitudes	  I	  know	  by	  inference,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  
reason	  why	  I	  must	  be	  alienated	  from	  all	  of	  them	  (157).	  	  	  
	   I	  think	  this	  misses	  the	  point.	  	  Even	  if	  I	  endorse	  the	  attitudes	  I	  ascribe	  to	  myself,	  there	  is	  a	  
kind	  of	  alienation	  implied	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  I	  should	  need	  to	  discover	  them	  by	  inference.	  	  Consider	  
a	  case	  of	  knowing	  that	  I	  believe	  that	  p	  by	  judging	  that	  p,	  and	  suppose	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  
that	  Cassam’s	  analysis	  of	  this	  case	  is	  sound.	  	  I	  consider	  whether	  p	  and	  reach	  the	  judgment	  that	  
p.	  	  So	  some	  part	  of	  me	  has	  taken	  an	  affirmative	  stance	  toward	  p	  –	  call	  him	  ‘MB	  qua	  judger’.	  	  But	  
by	  hypothesis,	  there	  is	  another	  part	  of	  me,	  ‘MB	  qua	  believer’,	  whose	  stance	  on	  p	  might	  yet	  
differ.	  	  We	  seem	  to	  have	  two	  points	  of	  view	  here:	  one	  which	  accepts	  that	  p,	  another	  which	  may	  
or	  may	  not	  accept	  it.	  	  Now,	  such	  a	  division	  can	  arise	  within	  a	  person:	  what	  I	  judge	  when	  I	  
consciously	  consider	  whether	  p	  may	  come	  apart	  from	  the	  attitude	  toward	  p	  reflected	  more	  
broadly	  in	  my	  behavior.	  	  But	  Cassam’s	  inferentialism	  builds	  such	  a	  division	  into	  its	  
characterization	  of	  even	  the	  most	  unproblematic	  case	  of	  attitudinal	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  It	  does	  not	  
matter	  that	  the	  stance	  on	  p	  expressed	  in	  judgment	  may	  for	  the	  most	  part	  coincide	  with	  the	  
stance	  embodied	  in	  belief.	  	  The	  point	  is	  that,	  even	  when	  the	  judging	  subject	  has	  settled	  on	  an	  
answer	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  p,	  there	  is	  still	  (in	  principle)	  another	  question	  for	  her	  to	  settle,	  
namely	  whether	  she	  actually	  believes	  that	  p.	  	  
	   Many	  contemporary	  philosophers	  are	  committed	  to	  this	  sort	  of	  picture	  of	  the	  epistemic	  
relation	  between	  judgment	  and	  belief,	  but	  I	  think	  on	  reflection	  it	  should	  strike	  us	  as	  strange.	  	  
Focusing	  on	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  judges	  out	  loud	  may	  help	  to	  bring	  out	  its	  strangeness.12	  	  
Let	  the	  subject	  consider	  whether	  p	  and	  express	  her	  conclusion	  aloud:	  	  
	   (1)	   Yes,	  p.	  	  	  
Now	  let	  her	  infer	  her	  own	  belief	  from	  this	  ‘external	  prompting’,	  and	  again	  express	  her	  
conclusion	  aloud:	  	  
	   (2)	   I	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  	  
Assuming	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  alienated	  from	  her	  own	  belief,	  we	  would	  ordinarily	  take	  (2),	  like	  (1),	  
to	  express	  belief	  that	  p.	  	  On	  the	  inferentialist	  analysis,	  however,	  this	  cannot	  be	  right.	  	  Whereas	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(1)	  may	  express	  belief	  that	  p,	  (2)	  relates	  to	  this	  belief	  only	  indirectly:	  it	  merely	  expresses	  the	  
subject’s	  belief	  that	  she	  believes	  that	  p,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  evidence	  that	  she	  believes	  that	  p,	  but	  
is	  not	  itself	  an	  unmediated	  expression	  of	  her	  first-­‐order	  belief.	  	  So	  her	  assertion	  of	  (2)	  expresses,	  
not	  an	  endorsement	  of	  p	  as	  true,	  but	  a	  (no	  doubt	  very	  well	  founded)	  hypothesis	  about	  herself.	  	  
If	  she	  were	  fully	  clear	  about	  her	  own	  epistemic	  situation,	  she	  really	  ought	  to	  say	  to	  herself:	  ‘Yes,	  
p,	  and	  so	  it	  is	  extremely	  likely	  that	  I	  believe	  that	  p,	  since	  my	  beliefs	  coincide	  with	  my	  judgment	  in	  
most	  cases,	  and	  I’ve	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  this	  is	  an	  exception.’	  	  If	  I	  received	  this	  sort	  of	  report	  on	  
someone’s	  beliefs,	  I	  should	  demand	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  believer	  herself,	  not	  just	  to	  her	  biographer,	  
however	  well-­‐informed	  she	  might	  be.	  	  	  
	   The	  uncanniness	  of	  the	  inferentialist	  analysis	  is	  even	  more	  palpable	  in	  the	  case	  of	  other	  
attitudes.	  	  Consider	  hope.	  	  Suppose	  the	  subject	  notices	  inner	  promptings	  (whatever	  these	  might	  
be)	  that	  she	  takes	  to	  reflect	  a	  hope	  that	  X	  will	  come	  with	  her	  on	  a	  picnic.	  	  Let	  her	  infer	  that	  she	  
hopes	  X	  will	  come	  and	  express	  her	  conclusion	  by	  saying	  to	  X	  	  
	   (3)	   I	  hope	  you’ll	  come.	  	  	  
If	  (3)	  is	  offered	  as	  a	  report	  on	  an	  inference,	  I	  think	  X	  should	  find	  it	  rather	  disappointing.	  ‘I	  hope	  
you’ll	  come’	  is	  normally	  heard	  as	  welcoming	  because	  it	  is	  taken	  to	  express	  hope	  itself,	  not	  just	  
belief,	  however	  certain,	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  hope.13	  	  Even	  if	  the	  subject	  adds:	  ‘And	  I	  (qua	  judger)	  
wholly	  endorse	  and	  identify	  with	  this	  attitude’,	  her	  remark	  is	  still	  missing	  its	  marrow:	  the	  hope	  
itself	  is	  elsewhere,	  and	  we	  are	  merely	  looking	  on.	  	  Parallel	  points	  could	  be	  made	  about	  other	  
attitudes.	  	  To	  treat	  all	  attitudinal	  self-­‐knowledge	  as	  inferential	  is	  to	  build	  alienation	  into	  the	  very	  
structure	  of	  such	  knowledge.	  	  	  
	   Indeed,	  even	  in	  the	  case	  described	  by	  Lawlor,	  I	  think	  inferentialism	  gives	  an	  unnatural	  
account	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  A	  person	  can	  certainly	  realize	  that	  she	  wants	  another	  child	  by	  paying	  
attention	  to	  her	  own	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  in	  the	  way	  Lawlor	  describes,	  but	  is	  it	  really	  plausible	  
to	  represent	  this	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  detecting	  some	  standing	  fact	  of	  the	  matter?	  	  Her	  feelings	  when	  
she	  boxes	  up	  outgrown	  clothes	  and	  receives	  news	  of	  her	  friend’s	  pregnancy	  are	  certainly	  
indications	  of	  an	  incipient	  desire,	  but	  ‘incipient’	  is	  important	  here.	  	  It	  is	  natural	  to	  imagine	  her	  
also	  thinking	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  having	  another	  child	  would	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  pursue	  other	  things	  
she	  cares	  about.	  	  What	  she	  wants	  to	  know,	  presumably,	  is	  whether	  the	  decision	  to	  have	  another	  
child	  is	  one	  she	  can	  genuinely	  embrace,	  and	  though	  ‘inner	  promptings’	  may	  serve	  as	  indications	  
of	  such	  a	  readiness,	  this	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  question	  of	  discovering	  what	  is	  already	  so	  but	  of	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reaching	  a	  settled	  attitude	  on	  the	  matter.	  	  To	  investigate	  this	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  matter	  for	  discovery	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence	  sounds,	  even	  here,	  like	  alienation,	  or	  indeed	  like	  bad	  faith.	  
	   	  But	  what	  is	  the	  alternative?	  	  Consider	  once	  again	  the	  simple	  case	  in	  which	  I	  reflect	  on	  
whether	  p	  and	  judge	  that	  p.	  	  Mustn’t	  I	  still	  make	  an	  inference	  to	  conclude	  that	  I	  believe	  p?	  	  And	  
doesn’t	  this	  inference	  rest	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  my	  judgment	  reflects	  my	  standing	  belief,	  either	  
in	  general	  or	  at	  least	  in	  this	  case?	  	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  for	  a	  full	  treatment	  of	  this	  topic,	  but	  let	  
me	  make	  two	  points.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  undeniable	  that,	  in	  unfavorable	  cases,	  I	  can	  seem	  to	  myself	  to	  
judge	  that	  p	  although	  I	  don’t	  believe	  that	  p,	  but	  it	  is	  contentious	  to	  describe	  these	  as	  cases	  in	  
which	  I	  judge	  that	  p	  without	  believing	  that	  p.	  	  To	  describe	  them	  in	  this	  way	  is	  to	  define	  judgment	  
so	  as	  to	  ensure	  there	  is	  only	  a	  contingent	  connection	  between	  judging	  and	  believing,	  and	  then	  it	  
looks	  inevitable	  that,	  even	  in	  favorable	  cases,	  my	  judging	  that	  p	  can’t	  justify	  me	  in	  ascribing	  a	  
corresponding	  belief	  to	  myself	  without	  some	  further	  premise.	  	  But	  it	  should	  not	  be	  granted	  
without	  argument	  that,	  even	  in	  favorable	  cases,	  my	  judging	  that	  p	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  
that	  I	  may	  not	  have	  the	  relevant	  belief.	  	  The	  inference	  from	  my	  epistemic	  situation	  in	  
unfavorable	  cases	  to	  my	  epistemic	  situation	  in	  favorable	  cases	  is	  no	  more	  straightforward	  here	  
than	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  perception,	  and	  in	  the	  latter	  domain	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  
philosophers	  reject	  the	  inference	  from	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  unfavorable	  cases,	  it	  can	  perceptually	  
seem	  to	  me	  as	  if	  p	  when	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  p,	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that,	  even	  in	  favorable	  cases,	  
my	  perceptual	  basis	  for	  believing	  that	  p	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  not-­‐p.	  	  Likewise,	  it	  might	  
be	  argued	  that,	  in	  favorable	  cases,	  judging	  that	  p	  gives	  me	  a	  kind	  of	  justification	  for	  self-­‐
ascribing	  a	  belief	  that	  does	  not	  leave	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  p,	  hence	  a	  
justification	  that	  needs	  no	  supplementation	  by	  a	  further	  premise.	  
	   Secondly,	  the	  idea	  that	  I	  must	  draw	  an	  inference	  from	  my	  judgment	  that	  p	  to	  the	  
existence	  of	  a	  corresponding	  belief	  looks	  most	  compelling	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  what	  warrants	  me	  
in	  ascribing	  a	  belief	  to	  myself	  is	  my	  awareness	  that	  I	  have	  made	  a	  certain	  judgment.	  	  But	  again,	  
this	  way	  of	  representing	  the	  matter	  is	  contentious.	  	  According	  to	  transparency	  theorists	  like	  
Evans	  and	  Moran,	  I	  can	  move	  directly	  from	  answering	  the	  world-­‐directed	  question	  whether	  p	  to	  
answering	  the	  self-­‐directed	  question	  whether	  I	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  Their	  idea,	  I	  take	  it,	  is	  not	  that	  an	  
awareness	  of	  my	  own	  judgment	  must	  mediate	  this	  step;	  it	  can	  suffice	  that	  I	  am	  (at	  least	  
seemingly)	  aware	  that	  p,	  without	  any	  need	  for	  a	  distinct	  step	  of	  recognizing	  that	  I	  have	  so	  
judged.	  	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  defend	  this	  idea	  elsewhere.14	  	  Here	  I	  will	  simply	  remark	  that	  Cassam’s	  
interpretation	  –	  that	  what	  justifies	  me	  in	  ascribing	  a	  belief	  to	  myself	  is	  an	  awareness	  of	  my	  own	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judging	  –	  seems	  to	  me	  already	  to	  introduce	  a	  dissociation	  between	  the	  perspective	  from	  which	  I	  
judge	  about	  the	  world	  and	  the	  perspective	  from	  which	  I	  self-­‐ascribe	  beliefs.	  	  On	  the	  resulting	  
view,	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  simply	  to	  look	  outward	  and	  affirm:	  ‘I	  believe	  that	  p’;	  her	  
basis	  for	  this	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  rather	  an	  inner	  event	  whose	  occurrence	  she	  monitors.	  	  I	  believe	  
this	  picture	  is	  not	  compulsory,	  and	  not	  attractive	  once	  we	  appreciate	  its	  significance.	  	  
	  
3.	   Self-­‐Knowledge	  and	  the	  First	  Person	  Perspective	  
Let	  me	  conclude	  by	  returning	  to	  Cassam’s	  challenge	  to	  mainstream	  theorists	  of	  self-­‐knowledge:	  
that	  they	  have	  focused	  on	  trivial	  self-­‐knowledge	  and	  thereby	  lost	  touch	  with	  the	  human	  interest	  
of	  their	  topic.	  	  Can	  something	  be	  said	  to	  justify	  all	  the	  ink	  philosophers	  have	  spilled	  discussing	  
how	  one	  knows	  that	  one	  believes	  it	  is	  raining?	  
	   Cassam’s	  challenge	  rests	  in	  part	  on	  his	  claim	  that	  philosophers	  have	  exaggerated	  the	  
epistemological	  distinctiveness	  of	  attitudinal	  self-­‐knowledge,	  and	  his	  case	  for	  this	  depends	  on	  
his	  inferentialism,	  which	  I	  have	  already	  disputed.	  	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  way	  of	  pressing	  Cassam’s	  
question	  that	  does	  not	  require	  the	  truth	  of	  inferentialism.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  force	  of	  his	  challenge	  
comes	  simply	  from	  the	  observation	  that	  attitudinal	  self-­‐knowledge	  is	  most	  readily	  available	  
where	  the	  attitudes	  in	  question	  have	  the	  least	  personal	  significance	  (cf.	  30,	  110).	  	  Where	  my	  
attitude	  on	  a	  given	  topic	  matters	  to	  my	  self-­‐image,	  it	  is	  common	  enough	  for	  my	  own	  assessment	  
of	  it	  to	  be	  unreliable.	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  this,	  how	  can	  we	  justify	  focusing	  exclusively	  on	  cases	  of	  easy	  
attitudinal	  self-­‐knowledge?	  
	   I	  think	  our	  observations	  about	  transparency	  and	  alienation	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  
answer	  this	  challenge,	  but	  let	  me	  emphasize	  that	  I	  will	  not	  try	  to	  justify	  inattention	  to	  the	  kinds	  
of	  self-­‐knowledge	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  achieve.	  	  I	  agree	  that	  it	  is	  worth	  understanding	  what	  
difficulties	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  substantial	  self-­‐knowledge,	  and	  how	  such	  knowledge	  matters	  to	  a	  
good	  life.	  	  It	  is,	  I	  think,	  not	  easy	  to	  frame	  questions	  about	  these	  topics	  that	  philosophers	  are	  
well-­‐equipped	  to	  address,	  and	  perhaps	  this	  accounts	  for	  the	  relative	  paucity	  of	  attention	  they	  
have	  received.	  	  But	  I	  certainly	  do	  not	  want	  to	  defend	  this	  neglect,	  just	  to	  defend	  the	  interest	  of	  
the	  topic	  that	  philosophers	  have	  more	  commonly	  discussed	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  ‘self-­‐
knowledge’.	  
	   Cassam	  anticipates	  that,	  if	  philosophers	  are	  asked	  to	  justify	  their	  focus	  on	  easy	  self-­‐
knowledge,	  they	  will	  respond	  that	  this	  knowledge	  is	  epistemologically	  distinctive	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
matters	  to	  philosophy,	  even	  if	  it	  matters	  little	  to	  humanity	  at	  large	  (43ff.).	  	  This	  may	  well	  be	  the	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most	  common	  response	  to	  such	  a	  challenge,	  but	  if	  so,	  I	  think	  the	  majority	  opinion	  does	  not	  
reflect	  the	  best	  reasons	  for	  interest	  in	  this	  topic.	  	  A	  more	  compelling	  answer	  is	  implicit	  in	  Sydney	  
Shoemaker’s	  remark	  that	  
it	  is	  essential	  to	  a	  philosophical	  understanding	  of	  the	  mental	  that	  we	  appreciate	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  first	  person	  perspective	  on	  it,	  a	  distinctive	  way	  mental	  states	  
present	  themselves	  to	  the	  subjects	  whose	  states	  they	  are,	  and	  that	  an	  essential	  
part	  of	  the	  philosophical	  task	  is	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  mind	  which	  makes	  
intelligible	  the	  perspective	  mental	  subjects	  have	  on	  their	  own	  mental	  lives.	  	  
(Shoemaker	  1996:	  157)	  
In	  recent	  decades,	  philosophers	  interested	  in	  the	  ‘distinctive	  way	  mental	  states	  present	  
themselves	  to	  the	  subjects	  whose	  states	  they	  are’	  have	  mainly	  focused	  on	  the	  ‘phenomenal’	  
aspect	  of	  conscious	  mentality,	  but	  I	  take	  Shoemaker	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  special	  way	  in	  which	  we	  are	  
aware	  of	  our	  own	  attitudes	  is	  another	  crucial	  aspect	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘the	  first	  person	  perspective’	  
on	  mind.15	  	  His	  claim	  is	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  this	  perspective	  is	  essential	  to	  an	  adequate	  
understanding	  of	  the	  mind	  itself.	  	  	  
	   I	  cannot	  defend	  this	  claim	  here;	  there	  is	  only	  time	  to	  express	  sympathy	  for	  it,	  and	  to	  
suggest	  that	  it	  would	  provide	  a	  powerful	  rationale	  for	  interest	  in	  the	  awareness	  we	  have	  of	  
(certain	  of)	  our	  mental	  states	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  the	  subject	  of	  those	  states.	  	  Note	  that	  this	  
rationale	  addresses	  us,	  not	  primarily	  as	  epistemologists,	  but	  as	  philosophers	  of	  mind:	  the	  idea	  is	  
that,	  to	  understand	  the	  mind,	  we	  must	  understand	  subjectivity,	  and	  subjectivity	  is	  expressed	  
primarily	  in	  a	  special	  mode	  of	  awareness	  of	  certain	  states:	  awareness	  of	  them	  from	  a	  special	  
standpoint	  one	  has	  precisely	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  in	  those	  states.16	  	  	  
	   Our	  observations	  in	  the	  foregoing	  sections	  should	  begin	  to	  give	  us	  some	  grip	  on	  how	  this	  
idea	  might	  apply	  to	  attitudinal	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  subject	  to	  
answer	  a	  question	  about	  her	  own	  attitude	  on	  some	  topic	  by	  treating	  it	  as	  ‘transparent’	  to	  a	  
question	  about	  the	  world	  reflects	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  participant’s	  standpoint	  on	  that	  attitude,	  a	  
standpoint	  that	  contrasts	  with	  an	  alienated	  standpoint	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  merely	  knows	  of	  the	  
attitude	  as	  a	  fact	  about	  herself.	  	  I	  believe	  understanding	  knowledge	  of	  an	  attitude	  from	  a	  
participant’s	  standpoint,	  and	  how	  it	  differs	  from	  mere	  cognizance	  (as	  we	  can	  call	  it),	  is	  crucial	  to	  
understanding	  what	  it	  is	  for	  reflective	  creatures	  like	  us	  to	  have	  a	  standpoint	  on	  the	  world;	  and	  
this	  is	  surely	  a	  core	  element	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  mind,	  whatever	  else	  may	  be	  contained	  in	  it.	  	  	  
	   To	  assert	  this	  sort	  of	  essential	  connection	  between	  mentality	  and	  subjectivity	  is	  not	  to	  
imply	  that	  a	  subject	  will	  always	  know	  her	  own	  mind,	  any	  more	  than	  the	  essential	  connection	  
between,	  say,	  the	  heart	  and	  the	  circulation	  of	  the	  blood	  ensures	  that	  the	  heart	  will	  always	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perform	  its	  function:	  in	  each	  case,	  there	  is	  much	  that	  can	  interfere.	  	  But	  if	  there	  is	  such	  a	  
connection,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  point	  in	  studying	  cases	  where	  things	  do	  not	  interfere:	  viz.,	  cases	  of	  
easy	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  To	  my	  mind,	  at	  least,	  this	  is	  the	  best	  rationale	  for	  studying	  the	  kind	  of	  self-­‐
knowledge	  that	  Cassam	  calls	  ‘trivial’.	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1	  An	  earlier	  version	  of	  this	  essay	  was	  presented	  at	  an	  author-­‐meets-­‐critics	  session	  at	  the	  2015	  Pacific	  
Division	  Meeting	  of	  the	  American	  Philosophical	  Association	  in	  Vancouver,	  Canada.	  	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	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Richard	  Moran	  and	  Ram	  Neta	  for	  comments	  on	  a	  draft,	  to	  Quassim	  Cassam	  for	  responses	  when	  the	  paper	  
was	  presented,	  and	  to	  several	  helpful	  comments	  from	  the	  audience.	  
2	  A	  representative	  sample	  of	  work	  in	  this	  tradition	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Cassam	  1996.	  
3	  Other	  notable	  contributions	  include	  Carruthers	  2011	  and	  Schwitzgebel	  2011.	  
4	  Cassam	  relies	  principally	  on	  the	  well-­‐known	  work	  of	  Kahneman	  (2011),	  Ross	  and	  Nisbett	  (2011),	  and	  
Wilson	  (2002). 
5	  Except	  where	  otherwise	  indicated,	  all	  page	  references	  are	  to	  Cassam	  2014.	  
6	  Moran	  does	  speak	  of	  the	  question	  whether	  I	  believe	  that	  p	  being	  transparent	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  to	  
believe	  that	  p,	  but	  he	  distinguishes	  this	  ‘deliberative	  question’	  from	  the	  ‘normative	  question’	  whether	  I	  
ought	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  (Moran	  2001:	  59,	  145-­‐6).	  	  I	  say	  more	  about	  how	  I	  understand	  Moran’s	  ‘whether	  to	  
believe’	  formulation	  below.	  	  
7	  Cassam	  in	  fact	  acknowledges	  that,	  in	  some	  cases,	  a	  subject	  whose	  attitudes	  are	  normatively	  irrational	  
may	  nevertheless	  be	  able	  to	  determine	  what	  attitudes	  she	  holds	  by	  using	  TM	  (cf.	  107),	  but	  he	  does	  not	  
seem	  to	  recognize	  the	  problem	  this	  poses	  for	  his	  claim	  about	  the	  connection	  between	  TM	  and	  the	  
assumption	  that	  we	  are	  Vulcans.	  
8	  N.B.:	  Not	  to	  judge	  whether	  I	  ought	  rationally	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  I	  do	  not	  ask	  whether	  it	  would	  be	  rational	  
for	  me	  to	  believe	  that	  p,	  but	  bring	  to	  bear	  my	  capacities	  for	  rationality	  on	  the	  question	  whether	  p.	  
9	  Cf.	  Moran	  2001:	  148.	  
10	  Much	  of	  Cassam’s	  discussion	  is	  conducted	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  relevant	  judgment	  is:	  I	  ought	  
rationally	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  I	  have	  already	  contested	  this	  way	  of	  representing	  the	  transparency	  proposal.	  	  
Here	  I	  set	  aside	  this	  feature	  of	  Cassam’s	  view.	  	  A	  version	  of	  Cassam’s	  case	  for	  inferentialism	  can	  be	  made	  
without	  this	  assumption	  (as	  Cassam	  recognizes:	  cf.	  117).	  
11	  See	  Moran	  2001,	  esp.	  Chapter	  4.	  	  For	  related	  points,	  see	  Burge	  1996.	  
12	  I	  consider	  verbal	  expressions	  of	  thought	  for	  vividness,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  think	  anything	  turns	  on	  this.	  	  The	  
subject’s	  private	  thoughts	  about	  her	  own	  attitudes	  would	  stand	  in	  an	  equally	  uncanny	  relation	  to	  her	  
attitudes;	  imagining	  these	  thoughts	  uttered	  in	  a	  conversational	  situation	  just	  focuses	  our	  attention	  on	  
what	  is	  missing.	  	  	  
13	  Cf.	  Moran	  2001:	  98ff.	  	  Note	  that	  my	  claim	  that	  the	  assertion	  of	  (3)	  normally	  expresses	  hope	  does	  not	  
rule	  out	  that	  it	  is	  a	  comprehending	  expression	  of	  hope,	  so	  that	  the	  expression	  includes,	  inextricably,	  an	  
expression	  of	  the	  subject’s	  awareness	  of	  hoping.	  	  It	  is	  only	  given	  the	  inferentialist	  analysis	  that	  (3)	  must	  
express	  belief	  that	  one	  hopes	  rather	  than	  hope	  itself.	  
14	  See	  Boyle	  2011.	  
15	  An	  indication	  of	  this	  is	  that	  Shoemaker	  cites	  the	  remark	  just	  quoted	  as	  a	  way	  of	  explaining	  what	  ties	  
together	  the	  essays	  collected	  in	  Shoemaker	  1996,	  a	  volume	  that	  centrally	  includes	  his	  well-­‐known	  papers	  
on	  attitudinal	  self-­‐knowledge.	  
16	  I	  believe	  there	  is	  also	  an	  important	  connection,	  not	  considered	  by	  Cassam,	  between	  the	  specially	  
immediate	  awareness	  we	  can	  have	  of	  certain	  of	  our	  own	  mental	  states	  and	  the	  question	  what	  it	  is	  to	  think	  
of	  oneself	  ‘first	  personally’.	  	  Oedipus	  knew	  plenty	  of	  facts	  about	  the	  person	  who	  was	  in	  fact	  himself,	  but	  
only	  at	  the	  denouement	  of	  Oedipus	  Rex	  did	  he	  understand	  that	  these	  were	  facts	  about	  himself.	  	  What	  is	  
involved	  in	  understanding	  this	  (i.e.,	  in	  grasping	  propositions	  of	  the	  form	  I	  am	  F)?	  	  There	  are	  powerful	  
reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  must	  connect	  first	  person	  thought	  with	  immediate	  
self-­‐knowledge.	  	  For	  classic	  discussions,	  see	  Shoemaker	  1968	  and	  Evans	  1982,	  Chapter	  7.	  
